


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


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
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
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*Nigeria: Lagos and the regional capitals continue to be outwardly calm, but there is considerable tension below the surface.

The four newly appointed regional military governors and the regional police commissioners were in Lagos yesterday for consultations with General Ironsi. A further structuring of the new regime, most likely including appointments to the promised "supreme council," may follow soon.

[redacted] planning by the new regime, which is functioning out of police headquarters, is still only on a day-to-day basis. [redacted] the leadership continues to be preoccupied with establishing its authority throughout the federation in fact as well as name. [redacted]

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[redacted] Ironsi is having difficulties with younger officers who are said to have their own ideas as to how the military government should be run. [redacted]

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Indonesia: President Sukarno continues the limited political offensive which he began on 15 January.

Yesterday left-wing students, apparently protected by air force troops, demonstrated at the palace in favor of Sukarno as a counter to army-encouraged student demonstrations against the cabinet. At a cabinet meeting later in the day Sukarno stated that although he was being pressed by "reactionaries," he would not retreat "even one millimeter" until God and the Indonesian people say he is no longer wanted. He reiterated his call for a "Sukarno front."

The President's support from the surviving left-wing political factions nevertheless seems slight. Sukarno's biggest asset may be the cautious approach of the army. It continues to acknowledge him as chief of state, and army leaders refuse to condone overt anti-Sukarno actions. They are aware of the need for the reestablishment of a single political center and are reluctant to create greater domestic turmoil now that the Communist Party has been suppressed.

Yesterday the army canceled a mass meeting scheduled for Surabaya which non-Communist civilian sponsors apparently had planned as a continuation of student demonstrations in West Java.

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Panama: [The Robles government expects soon to table a counterproposal on management of US bases in the Canal Zone under a new treaty arrangement.]

[In an off-the-record briefing to a visiting study group at the US Embassy on 18 January, Foreign Minister Eleta singled out the US-Spanish base rights agreement as a model of an acceptable political arrangement for the presence of foreign troops. The embassy believes he envisages some extension of the concept of "joint administration" of any bases the US retains in the Canal Zone. Specifically, Eleta mentioned the practice in Spain of flying the Spanish flag and designating a Spanish "comandante" on US bases, and the use of joint military boards to resolve minor disputes between US troops and Spanish nationals.]

[Eleta said that the Robles government would seek to justify a continued US military presence in the Zone on the basis of a Panamanian invitation to assist in the defense of the Canal. He added that Panama would not seek compensation for the use of land. The embassy concludes on the basis of private conversations with Eleta that the Panamanians do, however, expect "compensation" with regard to the canal itself.]

[At a closed-door session of the Panamanian National Assembly on 17 January, the foreign minister apparently reviewed the course of US-Panamanian negotiations, devoting most of his attention to the question of bases. Eleta told embassy officials he was much encouraged by the reaction of the legislators, despite hostile questions from opposition delegates. He said that he has been instructed by President Robles to hold a similar session with all cabinet officers and to appear again before the Assembly before tabling the Panamanian proposals with US negotiators.]

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NOTES

West Germany: The recent public statement by Refugee Minister Gradl on the concessions Bonn might make for reunification may signify the Erhard government's readiness to be somewhat more flexible on this issue. Gradl suggested that Bonn, during unification talks, could promise to restrict its armaments, institute a large-scale aid program to the East, and accept less than its pre - World War II borders. These suggestions are identical to those put forward earlier by Foreign Minister Schroeder in private talks with Western representatives. Reaction in Germany to the Gradl initiative has been generally favorable, which may encourage further official comment in the same vein.

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Aden: The recent merger of two of the three main South Arabian nationalist groups appears to be an attempt by the Egyptians to increase terrorist pressure on Aden and to give their campaign against British rule a broader base. The willingness of moderate nationalist groups to join in an essentially terrorist organization suggests that many of them now feel they must use violence to oust the British. The new organization's concentration on Aden and the exclusion of hill-country tribal dissident leaders from high positions may cripple and eventually terminate the generally ineffective campaign against the federation sultanates.

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Congo: After nearly two months in power, General Mobutu is encountering growing criticism in the Congo's provincial centers. Mobutu has been making little attempt to sell his wide-ranging reform program to the populace, and he asserts that the pressure of work prevents him from touring the interior to counter discontent. He also is inviting criticism by his tendency to pay attention only to a few advisers, most of them Belgians. *Mobutu's problems will be further complicated by a serious food shortage in the Leopoldville area.

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